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Abstract 
 
Jennifer Webster 
French Identity, Muslim Identity: Universalism, Laïcité, and the Islamic Challenge 
(Under the direction of Donald Searing, John Stephens, and Milada Vachudova) 
 
Europe is currently embroiled in a debate over the challenges Muslim immigration poses to 
national identity and cultural cohesion. As nations seek the best way to accommodate the values 
of the mainstream while respecting the rights and beliefs of Muslim minorities, they must make 
decisions about what tolerance really means, and the extent to which it requires secularism. The 
uniquely French value of laïcité, created from universalist ideals as a French solution to what was 
originally a French problem, is not incompatible with strong religious identity, but it is 
incompatible with the public expression of faith—an expression that many Muslims believe Islam 
requires. This essay will explore the reasons why the concept of French identity as universal and 
secular challenges France’s Muslim minority (and vice versa) and why the application of laïcité 
within a universalist framework is still the best way to foster the creation of a truly French Islam. 
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It was at the expense of their culture that European 
individuals gained, one by one, all their rights. In the 
end, it is the critique of tradition that constitutes the 
spiritual foundation of Europe.        —Alain Finkielkraut 
 
The Continental Context: In Search of a European Identity 
Over the past few decades, globalization has melted borders and brought different 
peoples, groups, cultures, and nations into ever closer contact with each other at an accelerated 
pace that shows no signs of reversing or even slowing down. This dynamic process encourages 
innovation, but also creates pressure and conflict as different ideas and beliefs mix and clash. In 
an ironic reversal of a previous tendency to view the rest of the world as its “playground,” Europe 
has emerged as a key region in this period of transition, as an immigration destination rather than 
a set of emigration nations (Bauman 2004:14). The European continent is now struggling to come 
to terms with new challenges created by its increased proximity to the rest of the world, so to 
speak, and it is being transformed in ways that will test the cohesion of our nascent global 
society. 
There are a number of factors contributing to Europe’s confusion. Globalization has 
created new economic opportunities for many, while forcing others into conditions of precarity 
and uncertainty. The European Union’s integration policies have dissolved physical, political, and 
economic borders between European countries, encouraging people, with mixed results, to 
subsume their national identities and to think of themselves as European rather than as Greek, 
Polish, German, or Swedish. Meanwhile, Europe’s immigrant population has continued to grow 
exponentially. New multicultural hubs, of which London is perhaps the most dazzling example, 
are teeming with people from all over the world, boasting a rich spectrum of cultures, languages, 
and faces, as well as a staggering variety of delicious ethnic foods (which is where my particular 
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attention usually wanders). Yet as stimulating as diversity can be, recent events remind us that 
anxiety and prejudice are seldom far below the surface in even the most diverse societies. The 
erosion of national identities coupled with economic uncertainty and the simultaneous influx of 
ever-larger numbers of immigrants has made Europeans feel insecure and confused, and terrorist 
attacks in Madrid, London, and elsewhere both exacerbate the situation and make it clear that it is 
not just Europeans who are having trouble adjusting to global pluralism.  
This internal upheaval has propelled Europe into a heated discussion about the nature of 
European identity. Questions about Europe’s physical and cultural boundaries in turn raise 
questions about who is or is not European, creating multiple spheres of belonging and exclusion. 
Attempts to consolidate Western space and identity have caused pressure to build along cultural 
fault lines. Fractured societies are emerging, where ethnic and cultural groups both native and 
non-native settle, congregate and interact in discrete territorialized blocs in an attempt to carve 
out zones of familiarity and comfort in the midst of difference, marginalization, and rejection. 
Étienne Balibar (2003:172) argues that “this differential inclusion of European apartheid in the 
process of globalization no doubt explains why, more and more, the traditional figure of the 
external enemy is being replaced by that of the internal enemy.” The subsequent climate of 
insecurity has crystallized in the current debate over the presence of Muslim immigrants, in light 
of their failure to integrate into wider European society to the degree desired by native Europeans.  
In many ways, France can be considered a microcosm of this situation. For several 
reasons, notably the 2004 ban on the hijab (headscarf) in public schools and the 2005 riots in the 
banlieues (projects), France finds itself in the eye of the storm raging over Muslim integration, 
and thus it is easy to view France as a sort of barometer for similar issues brewing elsewhere in 
Europe. Meanwhile, France’s universalist approach to its residents, Muslim or otherwise, creates 
unique advantages and disadvantages that deserve to be assessed. Europe’s cultural clash with 
Islam can be examined usefully in the context of the ongoing debate in France between the 
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French conception of identity as universal and secular, and the assertion of a specific Muslim 
identity as a quest for recognition in the public space.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiculturalism or Assimilation: Different Approaches to Integration 
From the Canadian “mosaic” and the Norwegian fargerik fellesskap (“colorful 
community”) to the American “melting pot” and the German leitkultur (“core culture”), every 
country has its own approach to integration. The merits of the British, Dutch, and French models 
have been among the most widely debated, and they are good examples of the variation to be 
found among European standards.  
The British approach to integration is a pragmatic multiculturalism that emerged from the 
historical Anglo-Saxon tradition of individual rights. This rights-based system emphasizes the 
value of individual and collective choice, and seeks to ensure the protection of minority rights 
from the tyranny of the majority. The British public space is a free space, and individuals and 
groups operating within that free space are allowed a fair amount of influence over the 
establishment of rules and regulations that affect them. By way of an example in the context of 
Islamic interests, the Muslim Council of Britain is arguably the most powerful Muslim 
organization active in national European politics today. Generally speaking, the pragmatic 
approach also allows for the negotiation of rights and preferences as circumstances require. For 
example, individual public schools are permitted to decide whether or in what form the hijab can 
be adapted to the dress code. 
The Dutch approach also emphasizes multiculturalism as a way to secure individual 
rights, but relies upon a system known as verzuiling, or pillarization, which encourages the 
division of society into ethnic and religious subgroups in a sort of “separate but equal” approach 
(Bawer 2006:13). The pillarization system creates a division of society such that many people 
have little contact with members of other groups—although after the historical violence that 
divided the Netherlands for centuries, the confrontation-shy Dutch view this as an acceptable 
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alternative to conflict. The Dutch public space is also a free space where freedom and tolerance 
are the rule, but due to the pillarization system, there are (so to speak) multiple spheres of 
freedom without much overlap. The traditional pillars of Catholic, Protestant, liberal, and social-
democratic—each with separate schools, hospitals, political parties, and even newspapers and 
television channels—were able to achieve an equilibrium, but the addition of more pillars has 
increasingly strained the system, as more diversity makes it more difficult to ensure “separate but 
equal” conditions for everyone (Bawer 2006:13).  
The French approach to integration, by contrast, is aggressively and unapologetically 
assimilationist, in that the particularities of individuals and groups are always subjugated to the 
larger idea of the universal. Assimilation is simply viewed as the best way to protect what are 
viewed as universal rights from the “tyranny of the minority.” According to Republican thought, 
“living together in a society requires agreement on basic values” such that “citizens must all 
subscribe to the same values in the public sphere” (Bowen 2007:11,157). Public space, therefore, 
is first and foremost shared space, where general interests and common ideals are valued over 
and above individual interests and diversity—an interpretation that places clear constraints on 
acceptable conduct and expression within that space (Bowen 2007:11). One such constraint is 
laïcité, the French conception of secularism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The French Ideal: Universalism and Laïcité  
The rationale behind the assimilationist approach to integration is undeniably traceable to 
the historical concept of universalism. Naomi Schor (2001:43) defines French universalism as the 
converse of particularism—ethnic, religious, national, or otherwise. “Universalism,” writes 
Schor, “was grounded in the belief that human nature—that is, rational human nature—was a 
universal, impervious to cultural and historical differences. Transcultural, transhistorical human 
nature was posited as identical, beyond particularisms” (Schor 2001:46). Inspired by 
enlightenment thinkers and the Revolutionary values of 1789, French universalism emphasizes 
the “universal human liberty, equality, and reason” that supersede “specific languages, ethnicity, 
and particularist culture”; to develop the former values, public expression of the latter is strongly 
discouraged (Bader 1997:779). The neutrality of the public space is considered absolutely 
essential to the correct functioning of this model, where “citizens, regardless of their regional, 
ethnic, or religious origin, are entitled, even required, to come together as equals to enact secular 
rituals and to reinforce the shared values of the social order” (Terrio 1999:441). Ironically, it was 
French colonialism’s later pursuit of the application of this universalism, which sought to extend 
the ideals of 1789 to other parts of the world, that Schor argues largely discredited the concept of 
universalism (Schor 2001:46). And yet, says Schor, “access to the universal … stubbornly 
remains a key phrase in France’s discourse of national self-representation and identity” (Schor 
2001:48). 
The practical application of access to the universal is provided in the form of French 
citizenship and the rights and responsibilities it entails. France has a relatively long history of 
immigration, and the early presence of immigrants in France prompted the state to establish and 
develop the boundaries of French citizenship, the conception of which has had a significant 
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impact on the social integration of immigrants (Collomp 1999:65). Rogers Brubaker contrasts the 
jus sanguinis (“blood right”) conception of citizenship, where citizenship is granted on the basis 
of ethnic descent, with the jus soli (“territory right”) conception, where citizenship is awarded to 
anyone born within state borders. Whereas jus sanguinis is a closed or resistant form of 
citizenship that enforces a particular collective identity based on national ethnicity, jus soli 
permits the assimilation of citizens by birth, by ritual conversion, or by naturalization (Koopmans 
and Statham 1999:659-660). France allows access to citizenship based on a combination of jus 
soli and jus sanguinis. Universalism supports the idea that anyone who accepts the values of the 
state can become French; immigrants are thus encouraged to become citizens on the condition 
that they recognize the dominant cultural and political values of France. This approach stresses 
that what binds people are universally shared values rather than racial or ethnic characteristics.  
The French assimilationist approach thus differs markedly from British or Dutch 
multiculturalism, which “strives to call attention to differences,” in that “French immigration 
policies have tended to assimilate difference in the name of a single nation” (Sniderman and 
Hagendoorn 2007:5; Schor 2001:50). Therefore, private identity has no right to claim a 
recognized place in public space, and the state denies public relevance to private identity. “As a 
historical entity, neither the French state nor any other state is absolutely neutral, nor can it be,” 
writes Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (1993:592). “For instance, it is not neutral about nationality: the 
public sphere in France is French, and the members of the public are French citizens, itself a 
historical concept.” Universality is thus paradoxical, in that achieving universal French identity 
requires the repudiation of specific individual identity in the form of any public cultural 
particularism. Tolerance is seen as something of a non-issue; if citizens adhere to common 
republican ideals in public and keep divisive personal beliefs properly tucked away in private life, 
then there are no differences that need to be tolerated, in the sense that there is never an 
opportunity for the contradictory private beliefs of citizens to meet head-on. “Assimilation does 
not signify tolerance,” according to Schor. “Indeed, it may be viewed as merely the most common 
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form of intolerance of otherness, or rather of the otherness of the other. In this critical perspective 
it is but another form of false universalism” (Schor 2001:50). Universalism is not so much a 
matter of excluding the Other, “but of including it to the extent that one renders it like oneself” 
(Schor 2001:50).  
Insofar as French universalism is an idea based around a particular understanding of the 
nature of citizenship and belonging, civic identity is forged in the great equalizing machine that is 
the French school system. Schools have historically been entrusted with the task of solidly 
grounding students in universalism and infusing them with the principles of liberté, égalité, et 
fraternité (Bowen 2007:12). As such, “the public school is meant to produce French citizens, and 
not the citizens of a multiethnic polity” (Galeotti 1993:592). In order to accomplish this goal, 
schools are expected to be a neutral space in much the same way as the state is, and for this 
reason adherence to the principle of laïcité, or secularism, is considered vital. Jules Ferry, the 
French pioneer of secular education, referred to the “école sanctuaire,” or the “schoolroom 
sanctuary,” as a place free from divisive exceptionalism (Kramer 2004:60). Far from being 
viewed as oppressive or restrictive, the principle of laïcité is considered essential to the successful 
integration of all members of society. The civic life of the state that awaits French students is seen 
as an extension of the same principles ingrained at school. Thus public life in general, and 
certainly civic life in particular, is not considered an appropriate forum for the overt expression of 
difference, and good French citizens are duly reared in accordance with this principle.  
French universalism takes a particularly hard line on religious expression, because it is 
seen to pose a more serious problem than any secular expression of difference. The significance 
of laïcité as a hard-won principle should not be underestimated here. The passion and fury of 
religious conviction fueled many of the wars that plagued France and much of Europe throughout 
history. The development of the policy of laïcité was the direct result of the state’s final triumph 
over the church and religion as “alternative sources of power and truth” (Bowen 2007:12). Laïcité 
is the symbol of state subjugation of religion and the banishment of belief from public space. All 
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of this should not be understood to indicate an incompatibility of laïcité and strong religious 
identity. On the contrary, laïcité in the public sphere is meant to safeguard the right to practice 
any religious faith of any strength—in the private sphere.  
Laïcité is idealized as a principle that protects state (and hence public) neutrality, but 
examining the details of its historical development reveals cracks in its façade of impartiality. 
Although laïcité revolves around secularism, the concept was developed as the result of hundreds 
of years of religious struggle among Christian groups in France, and is therefore a particular 
response to the Christian religious tradition and political concepts that were forged in the same 
fire. Put another way, laïcité has more to do with Christianity than is apparent at first glance.  
Despite a marked decline in active Christian practice among Europeans in modern times, 
recent polls indicate that there is a still a relatively high level of belief, indicating that Europeans 
are still “passively Christian” in large numbers (Klausen 2005:138). However, whether one is 
passionately or passively Christian tends to make little difference under laïcité, simply because 
the Christian assumption is that “faith is a matter of ‘belief’ and therefore about ‘thought’” 
(Klausen 2005:155). In the indigenous Christian tradition of Europe, strong belief does not 
require the public expression of faith, and so secularism has worked well to neutralize tensions 
between religious and secular forces in society. Laïcité, therefore, is compatible with Christian 
forms of organized religion precisely because they do not require public expression of faith. Not 
necessarily so for the imported faiths of immigrants, notably Islam and Sikhism, which to varying 
degrees of interpretation encourage or require public rituals and outward symbols of faith.  
Much like Orthodox Jews (who were once persecuted in Europe for precisely the same 
religious abnormalities), Muslims generally believe that faith demands not only thought, but 
specific action as well, and therein lies the major conflict between laïcité and Islam. “Europeans 
are generally willing to grant people the right to practice religion in private,” Jyette Klausen 
(2005:155) notes, “but are less comfortable with public displays of faith” of the sort found in 
Islam. Four of the five pillars of Islam—shahada (profession of faith), salah (ritual prayer), sawm 
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(fasting during Ramadan), and hajj (ritual pilgrimage to Mecca)—along with other “public ritual 
practices” such as the animal sacrifice of the Eid al-Adha holiday, give Islam an observable 
quality that Europeans are wary of (Bowen 2007:20). Such visible expressions of faith simply fall 
“outside the template” of organized Christian religion, in its comfortably contained form, 
“performed inside a familiar sacred place once a week, with teachings intended to guide private 
life” (Bowen 2007:20). Unusual clothing, beards, and veils increase the sensation that Islam is 
strange and exotic. “The headscarf and the mosque are not objectively more visible than the nun’s 
habit and the cathedral,” writes John Bowen (2007:20), “but they are subjectively shocking 
because they are new, foreign.” The French, who are even more sensitive to overt religious 
expression because of their history and tradition of laïcité, have a strong reaction when Muslims 
insist on asserting a different public religious identity. The tug-of-war between the public faith of 
Islam and the private faith of laïcité is symbolic of what it means to be Muslim in France today, 
where the complex subtleties of personal belief are influenced by a wide range of factors that are 
sometimes distant from purely spiritual concerns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The French Reality: Nous et les Autres 
 Over the past few decades, globalization has wrought swift and significant political, 
social, and economic changes in France. The shock of these changes has caused much anxiety, 
and prompted concerns about the survival of France as a country and as a culture. In such a 
situation, “to the extent that members of the majority attach importance to their national identity, 
the more likely they will be to perceive their cultural identity to be threatened. In turn, perceiving 
minorities as threatening, they reject them” (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007:6). The French 
have very strong attachments to their culture indeed, and immigrants are now bearing the brunt of 
their anxiety, as evidenced by the political resonance of right-wing politician Jean Marie Le Pen 
and his anti-immigration rhetoric, which blames immigrants for everything from unemployment 
to cultural disintegration (Amara 2006:21). 
 It is easy to see that diversity challenges universalism and laïcité in its insistence on the 
relevance of the particular and different. Many have protested that the universalist approach to 
assimilation can be said to support “a very thick ethnic notion of political culture” that favors 
only the state-sanctioned “official version” of French identity (Bader 1997:779; Ravitch 
1997:523). The same critics also note “French ambivalence toward immigrants who assert a non-
French cultural identity and maintain citizenship ties with their countries of origin while 
demanding political rights within France” (Terrio 1999:441). It is one thing to impose neutrality 
in the name of a universal ideal, but it is quite another when it is imposed out of simple 
discomfort. Over and above the lofty ideals of universalism and secularism, the French response 
to Islam has been directed by the much more mundane influence of culture in several key areas.  
 One example of this phenomenon is, again, based on religion, but in a different way. As 
previously discussed, laïcité is not as neutral as it appears, but when religion intersects with 
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history, it makes explicit “the contradictions already in place between French ideas about 
religion’s private character and the still-public role of France’s Catholic heritage” (Bowen 
2007:20). For example, in 1996, the state initiated preparations to celebrate the anniversary of the 
baptism of Clovis at Reims 1,500 years previously, marking the conversion of France to 
Catholicism (Terrio 1999:439). Many critics questioned the legitimacy of the ceremony because 
it blurred the usually very stark line between church and state, and thus the event could be viewed 
as an affirmation of France’s Christian past. Supporters argued that both the baptism of Clovis 
and France’s Christian traditions were legitimate parts of the national culture shared by all French 
people by virtue of their participation in the state, as acknowledged in an interview by Cardinal 
Lustiger, the Archbishop of Paris, in which he advocates the acceptance of a “master historical 
narrative” encompassing “all of French history, from its glorious memories to its dark ones” 
(Terrio 1999:448):  
They [French Muslims] need, on the contrary, to accept all that precedes [their arrival in 
France]: Charles Martel [celebrated as the vanquisher of the Muslim Sarracins] and the 
Crusades, the conquest of Algeria as well as decolonization, the Christian matrix of 
French culture and the separation of the church and the state. To accept is not to approve. 
They must be persuaded that, while remaining Muslims, they can not only enter into this 
history of France, but also legitimately adopt as theirs the entire history of the nation, 
because she adopts them legitimately as her children without asking them to forget or to 
deny their historical roots. Therein lies the paradoxical uniqueness of France and the 
integrative power of her culture. 
 
The fact stands, however, that the ceremony commemorated an event that, even if not celebrated 
qua Christian, was still a Christian event, while the state’s official position of laïcité affords no 
similar affirmation to religious minorities (Terrio 1999:442). 
 Thus the question of state neutrality is still a concern. But how neutral can a state be 
when its ethnic and religious history is inscribed into its political and social institutions—even 
into the calendar of religious and national holidays (Bader 1997:793)? How inclusive should the 
state try to be when “the elimination of all ideological and religious references would not 
neutralize the existing ideological tensions and conflicts,” but would only serve to “literally strip 
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people and institutions of all cultural particularities, histories, religious traditions, and practices” 
(Bader 2003:267)? Veit Bader (1997:793) writes that “no society can therefore totally avoid 
being biased against some of the practices of, and thus discriminating against, its cultural 
minorities. Its identity limits its capacity for fairness, and to ask it to be indiscriminately tolerant 
in the name of fairness to minorities is to be unfair to it. If our concept of fairness does not take 
into account the demands of communal identity, it becomes abstract, impracticable, politically 
irrelevant, and a source of much avoidable guilt.” This, in turn, raises the question of “whether 
dominant religious majorities are then simply free to impose their preferences on minorities” 
(Bader 1997:794). These are not easy questions to answer. Some sort of collective identity is 
necessary for cultural cohesion, but it is not easy to determine at what point such an identity can 
be said to become (or cease to be) “French.” Of course, while in theory the French conception of 
identity makes an effort to emphasize the universal, in practice it invariably extends only as far as 
the national. French identity, perhaps like any other national identity, is “not based solely on an 
abstract, ideological conception derived from the eighteenth century; there is also something 
deeper and at once more spiritual and more concrete involved. It is probably religion which 
sustains that deeper core of national identity, but certainly not without creating new dilemmas and 
new controversies” (Ravitch 1997:526). Clearly, the secular French approach has not succeeded 
in establishing a model that fully separates the political from the religious, or that eliminates the 
friction resulting from challenges to a fixed national identity. 
 Thus many religious Muslims find themselves shut out of French culture. It is true that 
some aspects of traditional Islam present several particular challenges to French identity and 
conceptions of the good life. Roland Barthes (1993:58-59) provides one example, unexpected yet 
pertinent, in his discussion of the importance of wine—a drink that is prohibited in Islam, along 
with all other alcohol. Barthes refers to wine as a “totem-drink” for the French, universally valued 
and possessing a deeply held sense of cultural significance:  
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… Universality implies a kind of conformism: to believe in wine is a coercive collective 
act. A Frenchman who kept this myth at arm’s length would expose himself to minor but 
definite problems of integration, the first of which, precisely, would be that of having to 
explain his attitude. The universality principle fully applies here, inasmuch as society 
calls anyone who does not believe in wine by names such as sick, disabled, or depraved: 
it does not comprehend him (in both senses, intellectual and spatial, of the word). 
Conversely, an award of good integration is given to whoever is a practicing wine-
drinker: knowing how to drink is a national technique which serves to qualify the 
Frenchman, to demonstrate at once his performance, his control, and his sociability. Wine 
gives thus a foundation for a collective morality, within which everything is redeemed. 
 
It could even be argued that the importance of pork in the place of French cooking, and many 
Muslims’ desire to eat only halal (permissible) foods or zabiha (ritually slaughtered) meats, 
presents a similar obstacle to French acceptance of Muslims into the fabric of their society, 
insofar as the French take a particular pride in their cuisine.  
  Clothing is similarly important to the French. There is a “connection between the correct 
physical appearance in public and personal dignity,” which is so strong that comments about 
clothing choices will even seep into academic writing and political news. Bowen (2007:214) cites 
the example of a French principal describing two different Muslim women. One was “not very 
religious,” wore casual clothes that were stylish and a bit revealing, and was described using very 
expressive gestures, as “the principal throws out her hands in an expansive manner, giving a 
sense of liberty and movement” (Bowen 2007:213). The other was more devout, veiled, described 
as “very strict, very closed,” and the principal’s body language reflected the rigidity that was her 
impression of the second woman. Bowen notes that something significant is seen in “the relative 
sexually open or closed quality” of clothing (Bowen 2007:213). Strange or “closed” clothing is 
actually seen as an aggression of sorts. “It is an assault,” pronounced one French woman, 
describing her reaction to another woman in the subway dressed all in black, forcing herself upon 
the world, “with her expression all frozen” (Bowen 2007:211).  Describing her reaction to 
Muslims in particular, the same woman said, “it was that they were throwing their difference 
right at me, that they had these principles, and were making me notice them” (Bowen 2007:212). 
 15
A different woman remarked, “they are showing off their Islam; that shocks me” (Bowen 
2007:212). 
 The concept of French identity, for all its universal claims, remains rooted deep in custom 
and culture, and a significant portion of the population has yet to accept the increasingly 
multiethnic makeup of the nation. “Put simply,” as Craig Smith notes, “being French, for many 
people, remains a baguette-and-beret affair” (Smith, 11 November 2005). And Muslims do not 
necessarily wish to be included in this identity either, as one Muslim girl from the banlieues 
illustrates (Bowen 2007:204): 
French people think that “to integrate”—and how I hate that word—you must drink wine 
and be like them, you have to lose your traditions, your religion, your values, and take on 
theirs. Either you assimilate … or you are perpetually an immigrant and an intégriste 
[fundamentalist]. But excuse me, I have never drunk wine, it is not in my culture, and I 
am not about to! I am in-between, moit-moit [half-and-half]. I do not feel French… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Battle for the Banlieues: Economics and Intégrisme  
 Although the universalist ideal precludes the French state from gathering statistics on the 
different religions practiced by its inhabitants, there are an estimated four to five million Muslims 
living in France. Nearly all are immigrants or their children (Bowen 2007:51). They live largely 
in the housing projects of the banlieues, the suburbs around large cities, with other immigrants, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim. The “material manifestation of [immigrants’] claims for 
permanent residence,” public housing blocs are typically inhabited by immigrant families and 
young single male workers (Hein 1991:593-594). While everyone, not just immigrants, can live 
in these buildings, fully 25 percent of all immigrant households are in public housing, which 
suggests a moderately high degree of segregation (Hein 1991:594). Public housing structures 
typically contain a small grocery store and offices for the distribution of social services, 
contributing to the ghettoization of residents, many of whom participate in social life outside their 
residences at a much lower rate than do non-residents (Hein 1991:599). These “highly politicized 
symbols of immigrants’ presence in France” came under widespread scrutiny in the fall of 2005, 
when immigrant riots in the banlieues of many cities across France flared up into violence (Hein 
1991:606). 
 The banlieues are overwhelmingly poor. Typically, immigrants are found more in 
unskilled manual and non-manual employment than other workers. Male immigrants are heavily 
concentrated in construction and the automotive industry, and female immigrants work in 
personal services. They participate in more temporary and part-time work than other workers, 
with the result that the wage level of immigrants is often relatively low (INSEE 2000). Although 
unemployment threatens large segments of French society, certain groups are much more likely to 
be jobless; youth, immigrants, and women are disproportionately affected (Kesselman 2006:244). 
 17
Immigrants are particularly susceptible to labor market fluctuations resulting from economic 
stagnation and depression. During the economic slowdown from 1975 to 1990, 40 percent of the 
industrial job positions employing foreigners were eliminated, affecting roughly 500,000 jobs 
held by foreign workers (Barbier and Théret 2006:127).  
 Popular fears and prejudice have also affected the job prospects of Muslim immigrants in 
France. For example, “in 2002, unemployment among immigrants of North African background 
was more than triple the average for native-born French. The most unfortunate are those caught in 
a double bind. Young Algerians (under twenty-four years old) are the holders of this distressing 
record: a whopping 56 percent were unemployed in 2002” (Kesselman 2006:244). In 2004 a 
French researcher named Jean-François Amadieu demonstrated the severity of this situation and 
its racial basis with an experiment. Amadieu “sent out seven identical CVs, but under seven 
different names and with different demographic facts. One was a white male with a French name 
and the other six had ‘problem’ identities ranging from being a woman or a disabled person to 
having a ‘bad’ address. The white male received seventy-five offers of an interview and ten 
rejections. The applicant with the Maghrebin [North African] name was by far the least 
successful and received fourteen offers and twenty rejections” (Klausen 2005:61).  
 Caught in a cycle of poverty, lacking access to employment and educational 
opportunities, and cynical about promises of French universalism that do nothing to alleviate 
persistent French discrimination, impoverished minorities are rejecting the identity that rejects 
them and replacing it with one of their choosing. For those of Muslim heritage, especially from 
the younger demographic, this has increasingly meant a return to their Islamic roots as another 
source of identity. Jocelyne Cesari, an expert on French Islam, argues that French Muslims have 
responded to rejection by inverting it. By further disassociating from the dominant French culture 
and reclaiming and reasserting the stigmatized Islamic identity, Muslims convert the 
stigmatization into a positive attribute and thereby diffuse its negative effects (Cesari 2005). In 
this way, the concentration of Muslim populations in urban areas becomes a community instead 
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of a slum, and thus in many cases, argues Cesari, “the imposed ghettoization is accepted and even 
desired. In other words, self-identification as a Muslim is in many cases a consequence of an 
ethnic solidarity maintained or preserved by the socio-economic conditions of segregation” 
(Cesari 2005). The newfound strength of this Muslim identity and its perceived radicalism causes 
much uneasiness in France. 
 Part of the concern is due to the different conceptions of Islam competing for the 
allegiance of Muslims. Moderate and progressive interpretations of Islam are pitted against 
resurgent fundamentalist Islam, alternately called Islamism, Wahhabism, and Salafism (or 
intégrisme in French). Moderate Muslims both in the West and in the Muslim world increasingly 
find themselves at odds with this ultra-orthodox conception of Islam, yet fundamentalism is a 
powerful force that continues to gain ground among the disenfranchised (Klausen 2005:156). 
Kemal Karpat offers an example of the difference between the fundamentalist and moderate 
discourses in his discussion of the two major schools of thought behind the issue of Muslim 
migration to non-Muslim countries. Muslims living in the West who are concerned with the 
preservation of their religious and cultural heritage might turn either to the fundamentalist 
discourse, which urges Muslims to hold to a strict interpretation of and adherence to ultra-
orthodox Islam, or to the moderate/progressive discourse, which centers on a more individualistic 
concept of Muslim identity that accounts realistically for immigrants’ conditions of life, 
encouraging them to strike roots in their new countries and adapt themselves to new lifestyles that 
may diverge somewhat from the traditional path (Karpat 1996:82-83). Moderate Muslims 
generally feel that “one should decide personally and freely that one is a Muslim regardless of 
whether he/she fulfills all or part of the requirements, the ‘works of the faith.’ From the vantage 
of Orthodox Islam, this view borders on heresy” (Karpat 1996:83). Further, moderate Islam urges 
adaptation to socio-cultural norms and pleads the case for harmonious coexistence with other 
religious groups, arguing that “there can and should be, for example, an American, a French and a 
German Islam” (Karpat 1996:83). 
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 But the moderate discourse sometimes goes unheard or unheeded amid the crumbling 
public housing complexes clustered in the banlieues, where poverty and violence are rampant. In 
these areas, fundamentalist recruiters with political goals provide an alternative to drugs, crime, 
and delinquency. For young Muslims who feel increasingly alienated by French society, 
fundamentalism can be a persuasive ideology that is compatible with their feelings of rejection 
and marginalization. Cesari (2005) argues that fundamentalism is pervasive and undermines 
efforts to bridge differences between Muslim identity and Western norms: 
The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings means that even non-Salafi Muslims 
evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahhabi standards. In other words, even if most 
Muslims do not follow Wahhabi dress codes—white tunic, head covering, beard for men, 
niqab for women—the orthodox Salafi nonetheless often becomes the standard image of 
what a good Muslim ought to be. … Thus, for those influenced by Wahhabism, the world 
is divided into Muslims and infidels, and the image of the West—automatically 
associated with moral depravity—is always a negative one: nothing good can come from 
the West, neither politics nor morality nor culture. Their perception of the West is as 
essentialized as their perception of the Islamic tradition. 
 
 The French government recognizes the risk posed by fundamentalism and has done quite 
a lot to “bring Islam out of the basement” and set it on equal footing with other French religions, 
in the hope of negating the need to seek funding and imams abroad (Bowen 2007:43). Islam is 
recognized as a state religion, which means that it is, in a sense, regulated by the state, through 
state-appointed representatives working in official institutions, such as the Conseil Français du 
Culte Musulman (French Council for the Muslim Religion) and regional councils (Bowen 
2007:48). As Islam is an official religion, Muslims can receive public funds to build and maintain 
community centers and cemeteries (and mosques, but as “religious buildings” the state will only 
authorize their construction if the mosque is attached to community buildings).  
 In the economic dimension, the government has created a number of special programs 
and expenditures specifically designed to combat the “problems of the suburbs,” which 
supplement the welfare benefits already available to both citizens and immigrants (Fetzer and 
Soper 2005:68). The primary social expenditure for immigrants is issued in the form of housing 
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and family benefits that supplement the Caisses d’Allocations Familiales (Family Allocation 
Funds), which are open to all French residents. These extra housing benefits were created because 
immigrants tend to have larger families (Hein 1991:593). Public schools where more than 30 
percent of the students are immigrants, or schools that are considered at risk for violence, receive 
extra money for better facilities and more teachers (Fetzer and Soper 2005:68). Finally, various 
Fonds d’Action Sociale (Social Action Funds) finance a number of social action and insertion 
programs intended to promote social integration into French society through vocational training, 
job placement, and especially language classes (Fetzer and Soper 2005:68).  
 But these efforts have not been enough. Beyond the familiar woes of drugs and crime, 
other disturbing things are happening in the banlieues. They include the physical abuse and 
intimidation of certain minorities, notably homosexuals and Jews, but the majority of the offenses 
involve the status and treatment of women (Amara 2006:26,66; Bawer 2006:110). These offenses 
are perpetrated by a small but vicious minority—which includes non-Muslims as well—and run 
the gamut to include misogyny, harassment, polygamy, forced isolation, domestic violence, 
forced marriage, genital excision, and rape. The latter often takes the form of what the French call 
tournantes, or gang rape, by young men who use physical violence to control the appearance and 
behavior of girls from “their neighborhood” in order to preserve their honor (Amara 2006:16,63). 
There have been several high-profile cases of violence against women in recent years, from an 
eighteen-year-old Muslim girl named Sohane Benziane, who was burned alive “for her rebellious 
behavior” in 2002, to another Muslim woman named Samira Bellil, who went public with her 
story as a victim in order to denounce “the violent gang rapes of young Muslim women for 
rebelling against the Islamic dress codes and gender-based behavior imposed by their older 
brothers” (Amara 2006:16). Bellil later went on to found the movement Ni Putes Ni Soumises 
(Neither Whore Nor Submissive) with Fadela Amara; the name of the organization is a reaction 
to the stereotyping of young women as “all whores except my mother,” according to the popular 
proverb (Amara 2006:2). Conditions in the banlieues are so threatening that many Muslim girls 
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begin wearing the hijab simply to avoid harassment; indeed, even some non-Muslims have 
chosen to veil in public or otherwise watch what they wear in certain neighborhoods (Amara 
2006:81; Bawer 2006:39; Bowen 2007:80,126,224). In this environment, makeup has become 
“war paint” and tight or revealing clothes are a sign of resistance and rebellion (Amara 2006:75). 
Rightly or wrongly, whether or not they are supported by the tenets of the faith, the French 
associate these things with Islam, and in this way they infer a link from Islam to violence to 
veiling. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’Affaire du Foulard: Women and the Burden of Multiculturalism 
 Norwegian sociologist Unni Wikan writes that “ethnic identity politics hinges on the 
behavior and demeanor of females: women and girls. … As a rule, then, the defense of cultural 
practices is likely to have a much greater impact on the lives of women and girls than on those of 
men and boys. … Females are asked to shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of 
multiculturalism” (Wikan 2002:156). In multicultural societies, certain cultural practices, often as 
atrocious and criminal as the ones occurring in the banlieues, have been tolerated for immigrants 
where they would not have been for natives—even after those immigrants became citizens. This 
double standard of evaluation is intended to be charitable in its respect for different values, but it 
amounts to a “generous betrayal” of the rights of all those who fall outside of “Western culture,” 
when defense of their culture is allowed to trump all else; in Wikan’s words, “human welfare will 
have to go, for above it, Culture is enthroned” (Wikan 2002:145). French philosopher Alain 
Finkielkraut makes a similar point, arguing that “at the very moment the Other got his culture 
back, he lost his freedom. His personal name disappeared into the name of the community. … He 
was trapped insidiously by his difference” within “the cult of time-honored beliefs” (Finkielkraut 
1995:68,75). French universalism, in theory, denies a basis for the idea that specific culture 
trumps universal rights, and when religion is seen as the source of social injustice, laïcité is 
invoked as a protection, which is exactly what occurred when the hijab was banned in public 
schools in 2004. 
 Alongside the persecution of women, homosexuals, and Jews in the suburbs, it seemed to 
many French that the supposed problems behind it were beginning to affect the school system as 
well. Muslim students, both boys and girls, were challenging the school system and engaging in 
behavior that contradicted the policy of laïcité: pupils were praying in school, proselytizing, and 
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bringing religious books to class (Bowen 2007:104,122). There was also a “catalog of refusals” to 
engage in other school day activities: students would sometimes refuse to sing, dance, draw a face 
or study an illustration of a classical nude in art class, eat non-halal cafeteria food, listen to 
lessons on the Holocaust, participate in swimming classes, or play coed sports (Bowen 2007:32; 
Bawer 2006:209). Some refused to read “Enlightenment authors such as Voltaire and Rousseau 
because they’re antireligion, Cyrano de Bergerac because it’s too racy, Madame Bovary because 
it promotes women’s rights, and Chrétien de Troyes because it’s, well, chrétien” (Bawer 
2006:209). They were, in short, asking for special treatment and special accommodation for a 
difference in belief that could not be acknowledged under laïcité.  
 More ominously for the girls especially, their abstention from mixité (social mixing, e.g. 
men mixing with women, or different elements of society mixing together) in school, whether 
voluntary or not, seemed to foreshadow their eventual withdrawal from French society entirely. 
This withdrawal or separateness is symbolized by the hijab itself. One young woman named 
Djamila, who has chosen to “announce her identity” and wear the niqab (a full veil that covers the 
entire face, allowing only the eyes to show) speaks about how she lost her job as a teacher’s aide 
because of parental concerns about her suitability as a role model for young girls, how the only 
job she could get was in telemarketing, and how her desire to veil kept her from playing 
basketball or pursuing acting, two enjoyable hobbies from her life “before the veil.” When her 
interviewer asked her if she felt excluded, she replied indirectly, saying, “we are not the same as 
other people.” “But the truth,” in according to her interviewer, “is that, from the perspective of 
most other Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, she has excluded herself” (Kramer 2004:59-60). 
 Only a few ago, few Muslim women in France wore any sort of veil at all, let alone the 
niqab. Now it is a common sight to see young women wearing the hijab, which is known in 
French as the voile or the foulard, a scarf that covers the hair and neck but leaves the face 
uncovered. While for many (if not most) Muslims the veil is nothing more threatening than a 
symbol of personal piety and devotion, the resurgence of fundamentalist Islam has caused much 
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worry in France that tensions over national identity are being exorcised on the bodies of young 
girls. For the girls themselves, wearing the hijab “was the beginning of a series of small 
exemptions from Frenchness—no sports, no biology, no Voltaire—that in the end had nothing to 
do with diversity and everything to do with isolation” (Kramer 2004:66). The French fear is that, 
rather than expressing their modesty or virtue as a personal choice, girls and women are being 
forced to wear the veil by young, radicalized Muslim men, their brothers and fathers and 
husbands, who enforce the wearing of the hijab as a sort of extension of their control over their 
own identities. This is the stated reason for the concern over the veil: that girls were being turned 
into provocations, not always by their own choice. While forced veiling is certainly an issue, that 
focus excludes the possibility that girls might legitimately choose to wear the hijab of their own 
accord, as many in fact do. 
 The veil is also interpreted as a symbol of rebellion, and France is responding to that 
challenge just as much as it is responding to worries over possible coercion. Some observers 
insist that “it’s clear to anyone, after a certain amount of time in France, that the veil involves a 
much broader politics than French domestic politics. It has to do with the Middle East and the war 
in Iraq and the Palestinian intifada” (Kramer 2004:70). As a provocative public assertion of 
membership in the Muslim community and culture, the hijab is interpreted as an attempt to 
undermine the ideal of secularism and universalism in favor of communautarisme, or 
communalism, a distasteful indulgence found in American and British society but not to be 
tolerated in France (Galeotti 1993:596). Galeotti (1993:596) argues that this is “a double 
rebellion” against both the “forced assimilation” required by the state as a condition for 
citizenship rights and the stigmatization suffered by the Muslim community for being different. 
The French thus interpret the veil as a symbol of primary allegiance to Islam rather than to 
France. They worry that the hijab is only the beginning of Muslim demands for exceptional status 
in the name of communautarisme, and that it reinforces a Muslim-French identity rather than a 
French-Muslim one. As the veil continued to be worn in French schools, the very core of French 
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identity formation, where students are expected to learn the value of universalism and laïcité in 
order to be able to behave correctly as citizens in the public sphere, such a rebellion could not be 
tolerated, lest hijab-clad women and bewhiskered men someday appear in the civil service as 
representatives of the secular French state (which would no doubt be considered a sign of the 
coming apocalypse). Interpreted in this way, the hijab ban is indeed very symbolic: a reassertion 
of Frenchness in response to an assertion of Muslimness, very much the most recent battle in the 
old war between church and state. 
Previous conflicts over the hijab had prompted the state to take the official position that 
religious symbols were acceptable in the secular state “as long as they are not used as means of 
pressure or proselytizing or do not hinder security and teaching, that is to say, as long as their 
dimension is private and they can be disregarded as statements while being interpreted as tastes” 
(Galeotti 1993:594). But more and more, it had become impossible for the French state not to 
view the hijab either as a statement of religious exceptionalism, a symbol of rebellion against the 
state, or the result of coercion; all three interpretations were seen as unacceptable. In French eyes, 
Muslim girls (or through them their parents and brothers) were “demanding expression where 
there is no room for it” (Kramer 2004:60). In August 2003, then-president Jacques Chirac decided 
that it was time to make a strong statement about the seriousness of laïcité, in order to send the 
signal that France’s secular imperatives are not subject to negotiation and that discrimination 
against women in the name of culture would not be tolerated (Kramer 2004:64). In March 2004 
the law was passed, and even though Jewish skullcap and Christian crosses are ostensibly 
affected, the new regulation is known popularly as la loi contre la voile—the anti-veil law 
(Amara 2006:21). 
Today in France the hijab is nothing if not a claim to public visibility for a collective 
identity that has been marginalized and stigmatized. The fundamental issue at stake for Muslims 
is that the assertion of social difference involves an explicit public demand for equality, including 
equal respect for the right of Muslim women to say that “it is with these clothes and this religion 
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that they choose to abide by the rules of the republic and life together” (Bowen 2007:249). 
Galeotti (1993:597) points out that “the kind of equality at stake here is equality of respect. If a 
social difference is denied public visibility and legitimacy in the polity, the group associated with 
it inevitably bears social stigmata; hence its members lack the possibility of ‘appearing in public 
without shame’—a crucial condition … for individual well-being and self-esteem.” Muslims fear 
that, by rejecting the hijab, the French are rejecting Muslim identity as incompatible with French 
identity; the French, meanwhile, fear that the Muslim rejection of laïcité is a rejection of French 
identity, as well as being evidence of oppressive elements that need to be stomped out. It is 
difficult for the French to know how to respond, not merely to an expression of difference, but to 
a visible expression of religious difference that is completely in opposition to many of their most 
fundamental ideals; it is just as difficult for Muslims to accept a total rejection of the identity that 
they so highly value. In the immediate future, France and its Muslims must walk a fine line 
together, in order to determine the extent to which they can each accommodate difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islam en France, Islam de France: French Muslims and the Evolution of Identity 
The apparent lack of integration among Muslim minorities is causing alarm all over the 
European continent, prompting a recent rise in multicultural skepticism. The fundamental issue, 
as Paul Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn (2007:11) point out, is “not diversity but loyalty,” and 
multiculturalism is now viewed as “encouraging an ambiguity of commitment.” Ironically, this 
ambiguity was encouraged by European political and intellectual elites, who evaluated the 
dangers of prejudice in light of the horrors of the Holocaust. “Against this background, to oppose 
multiculturalism was to demonstrate a lack of humanity,” and thus political and intellectual elites 
“ruled out a declaration of identification with the larger society as inappropriate” for minorities 
(Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007:11). In turn, Muslim immigrants, encouraged to retain their 
religious and cultural heritage, “have acted as though identification with the larger society was 
unnecessary,” leaving many Europeans wondering whether Muslims “continue to give their 
loyalty to the country they came from, not the country they have come to” (Sniderman and 
Hagendoorn 2007:11). 
The Netherlands, long considered one of the most open and tolerant nations in the world, 
has recently begun to acknowledge that the multicultural pillarization system of integration, 
which encourages people to maintain societal divisions in order to respect diversity and keep the 
peace, also makes it less likely that a divided society can identify together as Dutch and share 
Dutch values. Frits Bolkenstein, a former Dutch Liberal Party leader and EU Commissioner, 
made a speech in 2003 that was “widely regarded as an obituary on thirty years of Dutch policy 
and as marking a shift towards a ‘tough on Muslims’ approach” (Klausen 2005:69):  
We live in a free country, where everyone can come and go as they please, pray to the 
god of their choice, switch from one god to the other, and exercise the right of free 
speech. … That said, however, there have to be common standards respected by all. 
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These are anchored in our constitution and no amount of multiculturalism can be allowed 
to erode them. … And that is why I also reject the slogan ‘integration with retention of 
identity.’ … We should not always see ethnic minorities as victims. They are to be seen 
not as groups to be pitied but fully-fledged citizens. We must talk to them, in Dutch, 
about their responsibilities. 
 
 The British pragmatic approach, intended to safeguard individual and collective rights, is 
also being reconsidered as a tactic that may encourage the separation of different segments of 
society. In a controversial statement, British MP Jack Straw weighed in on the debate over the 
niqab, calling it “a visible statement of separation and difference,” and former Prime Minister 
Tony Blair commented as well, saying that “it makes other people from outside the community 
feel uncomfortable. No one wants to say that people don't have the right to do it. That is to take it 
too far. But I think we need to confront this issue about how we integrate people properly into our 
society” (BBC News: 5 and 17 October 2006). At the launch of Britain’s new Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion in August 2006, Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly indicated that a 
new approach to diversity is necessary, stating that “we have moved from a period of uniform 
consensus on the value of multiculturalism, to one where we can encourage that debate by 
questioning whether it is encouraging separateness. … In our attempt to avoid imposing a single 
British identity and culture, have we ended up with some communities living in isolation of each 
other, with no common bonds between them? I think we face the clear possibility that we are 
experiencing diversity no longer as a country, but as a set of local communities” (Kelly 2006).  
 And what about France? Dramatic upheavals in the organization of French society and 
the deconstruction of identity have caused a twofold, self-reinforcing response. The French are 
forcefully reaffirming many of their long-held cultural values, including the universal nature of 
liberty and equality, the importance of laïcité, and the rejection of minority cultural and ethnic 
communities; meanwhile, Muslims with French expectations, and (perhaps as a result) not much 
patience for French intolerance, are asserting their religious identity ever more strongly in the 
hope of being recognized as both French and Muslim.  
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 Despite the struggle, and whatever one thinks of enforced laïcité, it must be 
acknowledged that France is now seeing results where the rest of Europe is not. Out of the furor 
over the 2004 hijab ban and the backlash after the 2005 riots in the banlieues, France has 
emerged as “a bright light” standing out against “the general gloom” of pessimism over Islam in 
Europe (Bowen, 5 February 2007). A 2006 Pew Global Attitudes survey found that the French 
“are far more willing to get on with the task of building a multireligious society” than are the 
Dutch and British—or Americans, for that matter (Bowen, 5 February 2007). The survey also 
indicated a striking “French exception” with respect to identity (Bowen, 5 February 2007):  
French Muslims are much more likely than other European Muslims to emphasize their 
French identity. When asked to choose between religion and nationality as their primary 
identity, 42 percent of them said, French first, Muslim second. By contrast, only 7 
percent of British Muslims … put nationality first. By the way, Pew reports that 
American Christians choose between religious and national identities in almost exactly 
the same proportion as do French Muslims. In other words, French Muslims balance their 
identities in about the same way as do American Christians. 
 
In addition, French people generally think that Islam can be integrated into France. Seventy-four 
percent of all French people saw no conflict “between being a devout Muslim and living in a 
modern society,” while “only about half as many other Europeans or Americans denies such a 
conflict” (Bowen, 5 February 2007). This also means that “French people are more positive about 
modern Islam than are people in Indonesia, Jordan, or Egypt,” a striking claim indeed (Bowen, 5 
February 2007).  
 Many French Muslims have great hopes for Islamic life in France as well. Tariq 
Ramadan, a Swiss Muslim scholar with a large following among moderate European Muslims, 
argues that Europe could be the scene of an Islamic revival, “because European Muslims are free 
to develop an Islam that is a ‘pure faith,’ freed from the ethnicized doctrines and rituals that 
characterize practices in the Islamic world” (Klausen 2005:9). One result of secular democratic 
influence that has been somewhat controversial is the movement toward a renewed popularity of 
ijtihad (individual interpretation), which has realigned “the balance between religious law and 
 30
individual spiritualism” (Klausen 2005:158). “I became a practicing Muslim thanks to France,” 
claims one French Muslim woman. “I am glad to have come to know my religion, true Islam, 
because ‘back there’ it is too traditional and troublesome” (Bowen 2007:72). Another woman 
remarked that “we can practice the Islamic religion in the purest way, without all the cultural stuff 
of the first generation” (Klausen 2005:102). In this sense, laïcité can be said to safeguard a 
neutral space for the personal exploration of faith without coercion and away from the burden of 
tradition, culture, and ethnicity. And that is a sort of religiosity that the French are comfortable 
with: one that results from free inquiry and choice, and centers on life in France rather than life in 
Algeria or Turkey—a truly French Islam. 
But French Islam is just that—French Islam. The extreme secularism of laïcité is not the 
historical inheritance of other European countries, but the French have determined that, for them, 
national identity is secular and tolerance requires a public neutrality that laïcité has proved to 
provide. Other European nations, some of which are moving away from the multicultural 
tradition and toward the assimilationist approach favored in France, will have to make the same 
decisions about what their own societies require in order to foster the development of a Swedish 
or an Italian Islam, and a European Islam as well. 
Islam is not a monolith, and neither is Europe, although we often assume that they must 
be. The idea of Europe is large enough to absorb multiple identities—even française d’origine 
algérienne musulmane non-practiqant, or “French non-practicing Muslim of Algerian origin,” as 
one woman described herself—and indeed it must if it is to survive and flourish (Bawer 
2007:202). Craig Calhoun has emphasized “the fallacy of treating European identity, culture, and 
politics as internal developments of Europe itself,” and to be sure, there are a number of 
legitimate claims that Islam can make about its influence on the formation of Europe, not least of 
which is the possibility that Europe’s beloved “café culture” is an Arab import; in the French 
context, Tahar Ben Jelloun has argued persuasively about the linguistic debt French owes to 
Arabic (Calhoun 2003:3; Delanty 1995:128; Ben Jelloun 2006). Simply by virtue of a long and 
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often contentious concurrent history, Islam haunts Europe in much the same way that Karen Till 
suggests that the Holocaust haunts Berlin (Till 2004). The place-making of an Islamic space 
within a concentric European space (and vice versa) will create a framework within which a 
discussion of Islam’s ghostly place in Europe—past, present, and future—can be pursued as 
something more concrete. On the other hand, if Islam insists on being interpreted exactly as it 
sees itself, it will leave no historical room for this process to occur. To pursue the legitimacy of 
an Islamic understanding of and emplacement in Europe demands reciprocity: the consideration 
of a European understanding of and emplacement in Islam. In other words, Islam must learn to 
“be itself” in Europe, and Europe must learn to accept Islam as part of itself. 
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